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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic
Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The
follower has access to the state of the system while the leader
does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective best
interests, the follower’s strategy is to play the best response
to the leader’s strategy. In such a scenario, the leader has the
advantage of committing to a policy which maximizes its own
returns given the knowledge that the follower is going to play
the best response to its policy. Thus, both players converge to
a pair of policies that form the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
game. Recently, [1] provided a sequential decomposition algo-
rithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium for such games
which allow for the computation of Markovian equilibrium
policies in linear time as opposed to double exponential, as
before. In this paper, we extend the idea to a Markov decision
process (MDP) whose dynamics are not known to the players,
to propose a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm based on
Expected Sarsa that learns the Stackelberg equilibrium policy
by simulating a model of the MDP. We use particle filters to
estimate the belief update for a common agent which computes
the optimal policy based on the information which is common
to both the players. We present a security game example to
illustrate the policy learned by our algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stackelberg games are a very useful tool to model strategic
interactions where there is a dominant player called the
leader who commits to a policy and a follower that observes
the leader’s policy and plays its best response to it. With
the knowledge that the follower will play the best response,
the leader can devise an optimum strategy that maximizes
its own rewards. Such games, also termed as Stackelberg
security games, have become very popular in the recent
decade in building and analyzing real world security systems
in areas such as airports, seaports, and wildlife parks [2]. In
such games, the leader has an inherent advantage that enables
it to commit to a strategy that benefits it irrespective of the
strategy followed by the follower given that it is rational
and will play the best response. Such one shot equilibrium
games have also proven useful for economic firms to analyze
markets and take competitive risks.
Most of the prior work consider single shot Bayesian
game models where the leader and the follower interact
only once. However, most practical systems entail a periodic
interaction between the leader and the follower. Computing
Stackelberg equilibria for such stochastic games was un-
known. Recently [1] presented a sequential decomposition
algorithm to compute Markov perfect Stackelberg equilib-
rium (PSE) (MPSE) of such games. Solving a dynamic
stochastic Stackelberg game when the follower has a pri-
vate Markovian state is computationally challenging. This is
because, unlike other games, dynamic games of asymmetric
information have players’ strategies that are coupled across
time. Since strategy of a player is a mapping from each
history of the game which grows exponentially with time,
the space of strategies of the players is double exponential,
rendering such problems intractable. Recently, there has been
results on sequential decomposition of certain classes of
games of asymmetric information ([3], [4], [1]). In repeated
Stackelberg security games, there have been other approaches
to mitigate this issue. For instance, [5] considers a repeated
Stackelberg game and uses a new human behavior model to
study such games. [6] consider a learning theoretic approach
to study a repeated Stackelberg game between attacker and
defender where they use regret analysis to learn attacker
types, and show sub-linear regret for both complete and
partial information models. There also have been efforts to
develop RL algorithms to study models with asymmetric
information in [7] for repeated Bayesian Stackelberg games.
Kalman filters have been widely used for Gaussian state
space modelling but the advent of sequential monte carlo
methods can be attributed to certain applications where non-
Gaussian state space modelling was required [8]. Particle
filters are sequential monte carlo filters that approximate the
belief on a state, in other words, the probability of a system
of being in a particular state, from an empirical distribution
based on the observed history when model dynamics are
unknown [9], [10]. It is widely popular in applications like
robotics for localizations and fault dynamics, where most
of the times the environment is non-Gaussian and needs to
learned based on collected samples and observations [11].
These methods utilize a K number of random samples
or particles, where K is large, to represent the posterior
probability of the state based on the observations.
In this paper, we propose an RL algorithm with particle
filters to learn the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies for a
rational, leader and follower, when the players are unaware
of the dynamics of the game. The algorithm learns the Q
values using the Expected Sarsa and then solves a fixed point
equation for the follower and a maximization equation for
the leader to converge upon the strategies. We use a common
agent approach [12] wherein a fictitious common agent has
access to the common information that is shared between
the players and uses it to compute a belief on the private
state. It then solves for the optimal policies using the RL
algorithm and updates the belief using the particle filters.
The use of RL algorithm with particle filters for solving for
Stackelberg equilibrium is novel. We illustrate our algorithm
by determining the strategies for a realistic security game
example to show that the algorithm derived, coincides with
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the optimal strategy that was obtained in [1], where it was
assumed that the dynamics of the game were known.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented
in Section II followed by a discussion on the sequential
decomposition algorithm in Section III. We present our
proposed algorithm in Section IV and prove convergence to
the Stackelberg equilibrium in Section VII. In Section VI, we
provide an example to showcase our results and conclude in
Section VII.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lower-
case for their realizations. For any variable, subscripts repre-
sent time indices and superscripts represent player identities,
‘l’ for the leader and ‘f ’ for the follower. For any finite
set S, P(S) represents space of probability measures on
S and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by Pσ (or
Eσ) the probability measure generated by (or expectation
with respect to) strategy profile σ and the space for all such
strategies as Kσ . We denote the set of real numbers by R. All
equalities and inequalities involving random variables are to
be interpreted in an a.s. sense.
II. MODEL
Consider a stochastic Stackelberg game over a time hori-
zon T with perfect recall between two players: a leader and
a follower. The actions and the states are defined over finite
sets A and X respectively. Al denotes the action set of the
leader while Af represents that of the follower. The state xt
evolves as the following controlled Markov process
P (xt|a1:t−1, x1:t−1) = τ (xt|at−1, xt−1) , (1)
where at =
(
alt, a
f
t
)
are the actions of the leader and
the follower. The action history a1:t−1 is shared between
both the players as common information. However, only the
follower has access to the private information x1:t. The leader
observes the common information a1:t−1 and takes action
alt ∈ Al while the follower observes the private information
x1:t and the common information a1:t−1 and takes action
aft ∈ Af .
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the sequential decomposition
algorithm which used to compute the Stackelberg equilib-
rium policies for the case when the model is known to the
players.
A. Stackelberg Equilibrium
Given a strategy profile σl for the leader, the follower
maximizes its own total discounted expected rewards over a
finite horizon T as
f
max
σ
Eσ
l,σf
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rft (Xt, At)
]
. (2)
Now, if we denote Λf (σl) to be the set of all optimizing
strategies for the follower, given a strategy σl of the leader,
we get
Λf (σl) = arg max
σf
Eσ
l,σf
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rft (Xt, At)
]
. (3)
With the information that follower is going to play the best
response to its strategy, the leader tries to maximize its
own total expected discounted rewards by finding an optimal
strategy. In other words, knowing the follower’s counter
strategy to be Λf (σl), the leader tries to solve the following
maximization equation to compute its own strategy:
σ˜l ∈ max
σl
Eσ
l,Λf (σl)
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rlt(Xt, At)
}
. (4)
Both leader and follower successively play this game and
converge upon a pair of strategies (σ˜l, σ˜f ) constituting a
Stackelberg equilibrium where σ˜f ∈ Λf (σ˜l).
B. Perfect Stackelberg equilibrium
The notion of PSE, as introduced in [13], is in line with
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) discussed in [14]. In
the context of the game, the leader and the follower play
their actions alt ∼ σ˜lt (·|a1:t−1) and aft ∼ σ˜ft (·|a1:t−1, xt)
with σ˜ =
(
σ˜f , σ˜l
)
constituting the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Assume (σ˜, µ) is a PSE of the game, where µ = (µt)t∈[T ]
and σ˜ =
(
σ˜f , σ˜l
)
with σ˜f ∈ Λft (σ˜l) ∀ t ∈ [T ]. For any t and
action history a1:t−1, µt[a1:t−1] ∈ P(X ) is the equilibrium
belief on the current follower’s state xt, i.e. µt[a1:t−1](xt) =
Pσ˜(xt|a1:t−1). For any given σl, Λft (σl) be defined as ∀hft ,
Λft (σ
l)
4
= arg max
σf
Eσ
l,σf ,µt
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|hft
]
(5)
and
σ˜l ∈ max
σl
Eσ
l,Λf (σl),µt
[
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|hct
]
. (6)
where hft = (a1:t−1, x1:t) and h
c
t = a1:t−1.
For the case of PSE the sum of expected returns can be
expressed as
Jf,σ
f ,σl,pi
t =
Eσ
f
t:T ,σ
l
t:T ,pit
[
T∑
k=t
δk−tRft (Xk, Ak) |x1:t, a1:t−1
]
, (7)
J l,σ
f ,σl,pi
t = Eσ
l
t:T ,σ
f
t:T ,pit
[
T∑
k=t
δk−tRlt (Xk, Ak) |a1:t−1
]
.
(8)
C. Common agent approach
We use the common agent approach in line with the
common information approach that was used in [12]. An
arbitrary common agent with access to the common infor-
mation a1:t−1 generates prescription functions γt = (γlt, γ
f
t ).
The prescription functions γlt ∈ P(Ai) and γft : X t →
P(Ai) are used by the leader and the follower to generate
their actions as alt ∼ γlt(·) and aft ∼ γft (·|x1:t).
We denote the prescription functions as γt = (γlt, γ
f
t )
as θt[pit] with pit(xt) = P θ(xt|a1:t−1). In other words,
the Markovian common agent computes the prescription
functions as function of the belief state pit, which it derives
from the common information a1:t−1. The belief state pit is
given as
pit = Pθ˜ (xt|a1:t) (9)
which denotes the distribution of the state conditioned on
the observed action history. The follower uses γft to operates
on its current private state xt to produce its action a
f
t , i.e.
γft : X → P(Af ) and aft ∼ γft (·|xt). while the leader uses
γlt to produce its action a
l
t as γ
l
t ∈ P(Af ) and alt ∼ γft (·).
In order to track the belief state pit we derive a recursive
equation given a policy θ˜t.
Lemma 1: For any given policy of type θ, there exists
update functions F , independent of θ, such that
pit+1 = F (pit, γ
f
t , at) (10)
which can be elaborated using the Bayes’ theorem as
pit+1 (xt+1) = Pθ (xt+1|a1:t)
=
∑
xt∈X pit (xt) γ
f
t
(
aft |xt
)
Qx (xt+1|xt, at)∑
xt∈X pit (xt) γ
f
t
(
aft |xt
)
(11)
In summary, at time t, the common agent observes the
action history at−1 and generates the optimal policy θ˜ as
a function of the belief pit. Corresponding to each belief
pit ∈ Π, the generated prescription function γ˜t =
(
γ˜ft , γ˜
l
t
)
specifies the actions to be taken by the players. The optimal
policy and the actions thus generated are used to obtain the
next belief pit+1 using (11).
D. Particle Filters
The main challenge in computing the updated belief pit+1
from current belief pit without knowledge of the transition
function τ . Particle filters are sequential monte carlo filters
that approximate the state distribution from an empirical
distribution based on the observed history. These methods
utilize a K number of random particles to represent the
posterior probability of the state based on the observations.
These filters approximates the belief state pit by a set of
K sampled points from the state space xt ∈ X , updated in
a sequential manner at every observation point at, which
also serves as an action in our case, through a selection
procedure to establish the truthfulness of the belief based on
the observation. In other words, the belief using a particle
filter could be expressed as,
pit =
1
K
K∑
i=1
f (xt) . (12)
The generic particle filter called the bootstrap filter that
samples the states from a previous distribution and the
resamples based on observations. It is estimated using an
empirical distribution given as
pii (xt)
4
=
K∑
j=1
δxtw
j
t , (13)
where δxt is a dirac delta function made up of K parti-
cles x1:Kt . The algorithm recursively consists of two steps,
a transition step to sample K particles from the current
distribution and to obtain the samples corresponding to the
next states for each of the sample according to the transition
function. This is followed by a selection step where it is
resampled according to the weights wt generated based
on the observations. The algorithm can be summarized as
below [15], [16], [17].
1) Initialize, t = 0, xi0 ∼ pit (·), set t = 1,
2) For t = 1, 2, 3, . . .,
Importance sampling:
a) For i = 1 . . .K, sample from the model, x̂i ∼
P (xt+1|xt, at)
b) For i = 1 . . .K, compute the weights in pro-
portion to the chances of the next state with the
current observation at
wit =
Pθ (at, x̂i)∑K
j=1 Pθ (at, x̂j)
(14)
Selection/ resampling
a) Resample from the list (x̂t+1) with replacement
according to the weights to get (xt+1). This is
done by choosing from indices {1 . . .K} accord-
ing to the multinomial distribution (w1 . . . wK).
b) The new belief state estimate is then,
pi (xt)
4
=
K∑
i=1
δxt+1 (15)
The multinomial distribution used for resampling is one of
the simplest methods that was introduced in [18]. This meth-
ods redistributes the samples based on their corresponding
weights. Other versions of the resampling method include
the stratified sampling method that reduces variance [8], [9].
The common agent employs a 2 parallel particle filters
that estimate Pθ (xt+1|a1:T ) for each of the player given the
policy θ. The particle filter as a module takes in the current
belief vector, the corresponding policy and the observation
vector. It uses the model to sample the next steps and then
computes the posterior distribution.
E. Algorithm for MPSE computation
In this section, we discuss the sequential decomposition
algorithm stated in [13] but using the belief estimated using
the particle filters to compute the equilibrium strategies by
solving equations (5) and (6).
1) Backward Recursion: In a general RL setting, with
finite state space X and finite action space A, we can express
the Q-value for the state action pair (xt, at) for all xt ∈ X ,
at ∈ A in terms of the reward Rt (xt, at) as
Qt (xt, at) = Rt (xt, at) + δEτ [Vt+1 (Xt+1)] . (16)
Here Qx (·|xt, at) represents the dynamics of the MDP.
Vt+1 (·) gives the value function at the future state and δ
is the discounting parameter. Our algorithm is based on
Expected Sarsa, which is a model free RL algorithm that does
not require the knowledge of model dynamics and produces
a low variance estimate of the Q-value function.
Let us define an equilibrium generating function θ˜ =
(θ˜it)i∈{l,f},t∈[T ], where θ˜t : P(X ) →
{X → P(Af )} ×
P(Al). In addition, we define value functions
(
V ft , V
l
t
)
and
action value functions (Qlt, Q
f
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1} , where
V ft : P(X )×X → R
V lt : P(X )→ R
Qft : P(X )×X ×A× Γf → R
Qlt : P(X )×A× Γf → R
Here we describe the backward recursive algorithm that is
used to compute the strategies using the value functions for
each discrete value of the estimated belief state pit.
1) Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X ), xT+1 ∈ X ,
V fT+1 (piT+1, xT+1)
4
= 0 (17)
V lT+1 (piT+1)
4
= 0 (18)
2) For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ P(X ), let θ˜t[pit] be
generated as follows.
∀pit ∈ Π, xt ∈ X , at ∈ A and γ˜ft ∈ Kγ
f
, compute
Qlt and Q
f
t as
Qft
(
pit, xt, at, γ˜
f
t
)
= Eτ
[
Rft (xt, at) +
δV ft+1
(
F̂ f
(
pit, γ˜
f
t , at
)
, Xt+1
)
|xt
]
(19)
Qlt
(
pit, at, γ˜
f
t
)
= Eτ,pit
[
Rlt (Xt, at) +
δV ft+1
(
F̂ l
(
pit, γ˜
f
t , at
)) ]
(20)
where F̂ (·) represents the particle filter function.
Set γ˜t = θ˜t[pit], where γ˜t =
(
γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t
)
is the solution
of the following fixed-point equation.
∀γlt ∈ Kγ
l
, define Λ(γlt) as follows, ∀xt ∈ X ,
Λft (γ
l
t) =
{
γ˜ft : γ˜
f
t ∈
arg max
γft (·|xt)
Eγ
f
t (·|xt),γlt
[
Qft
(
pit, xt, At, γ˜
f
t
)]}
.
(21)
The solution to the strategy for the leader is compute
using
γ˜lt ∈ arg max
γlt
EΛ
f
t (γ
l
t)γ
l
t
[
Qlt
(
pit, At, γ˜
f
t
)]
(22)
The solution to the above two steps generate (γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t )
as pair of equilibrium strategies.
Now, we calculate the utility function values ∀xt ∈ X ,
V ft (pit, xt)
4
= Eγ˜
f
t (·|xt)γ˜lt, pit
[
Rft (xt, At) +
δV ft+1
(
F̂ f
(
pit, γ˜
f
t , At
)
, Xt+1
) ∣∣xt]
(23)
and
V lt (pit)
4
= Eγ˜
f
t γ˜
l
t, pit
[
Rlt (Xt, At) +
δV lt+1
(
F̂ l
(
pit, γ˜
f
t , At
)) ]
. (24)
2) Forward Recursion: Based on θ˜ defined in the back-
ward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies
σ˜ (through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1) Initialize at time t = 1,
µ1[φ] (x1) := τ (x1) . (25)
2) For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, a1:t ∈ Hct+1, x1:t ∈ X t
σ˜lt
(
alt|a1:t−1
)
:= θ˜lt [µt [h
c
t ]]
(
alt
)
(26)
σ˜ft
(
aft |a1:t−1, x1:t
)
:= θ˜ft [µt [h
c
t ]]
(
aft |xt
)
(27)
µt+1
[
hct+1
]
:= F
(
µt [h
c
t ] , θ˜
f
t [µt [h
c
t ]] , at
)
(28)
where F is defined in (10).
IV. REINFORCEMENT ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a model-free RL algorithm
based on Expected Sarsa [19] to compute the optimal MPSE
strategy both for the leader and the follower. We follow the
steps summarized in the sequential decomposition algorithm
to derive these strategies. The algorithm iterates between the
policy evaluation and policy improvement steps sequentially.
At each instant t, and at each discretized belief state pit ∈ Π,
we compute Qit as in (19) and (20) using Expected Sarsa
as a function of the equilibrium policy of the follower
θ˜ [pit] = γ˜
f
t . This is essential in solving the fixed point
equations for model free algorithms. Thereafter, we compute
the optimal policies for the follower and the leader by solving
the fixed point equation in (21) and the maximization in (22)
respectively. The value functions V ft and v
l
t are updated after
the optimal policy θ˜t is computed using the equations in (23)
and (24) to be used in the computation of Qit in the next
iteration.
A. Policy Evaluation
The Q-value functions Qft and Q
l
t are computed from
a sampled trajectory from the model bootstrapping it with
the future value function V it+1. It involves sampling from
a model simulation of a generic player i ∈ {l, f} which
takes a current state xt ∈ X and actions at ∈ A, for every
belief state pit and provides the next state xt+1 and the
corresponding reward Rit(xt, at). In the beginning of each
iteration, the belief state estimate is updated to pit+1 from the
current estimated belief state pit at the equilibrium policy γ
f
t
by feeding the observation vector at to the particle filter. It
is computed separately for the follower and the leader as the
model is not known to either of them. We use Expected Sarsa
algorithm to update the Q-value for both the follower and
the leader synchronously using the same simulated trajectory.
Expected Sarsa follows the TD learning method where the
update equation is given as
Qft
(
pit, xt, at, γ˜
f
t
)
= (1− α)Qft
(
pit, xt, at, γ˜
f
t
)
+α
(
Rft (xt, at) + δV
f
t+1
(
pift+1, xt+1
))
(29)
Qlt
(
pit, at, γ˜
f
t
)
= (1− α)Qlt
(
pit, at, γ˜
f
t
)
+α
(
Epit [Rlt (Xt, at)] + δV lt+1
(
pift+1
))
(30)
where (xt, at, xt+1) are sampled from a simulated model
and α is the learning parameter. We use linear interpolation
to obtain V ft+1 (pit+1, xt+1), V
l
t+1 (pit+1) at a future state.
The updated belief state is generated using the particle filter
algorithm that was put forth in III-D. It takes in the current
belief state pit, the follower’s policy γ˜
f
t and the observation
at and provides the empirical distribution pit+1.
B. Policy Iteration
1) Follower Strategy: The fixed point equation in (21) is
solved at the follower, for each discrete belief state pit ∈ Π, to
compute the follower’s equilibrium strategy corresponding to
each of the leader’s strategy γlt ∈ Kγ
l
. Given the follower’s
Qft -value function, the objective function for xt ∈ X with
any strategy γft can be expressed as
γ˜ft = arg max
γft
E
[
Qft
(
pit, xt, At, γ
f
t
)]
. (31)
The expectation is taken over At through the measure
γft (·|xt) γlt (·) representing the leader’s strategy. It is solved
by a continuous policy update in the direction of ascent
of the gradient. This is achieved using any of the policy
gradient approaches. In this paper, we use neural network
based policy gradient method to compute the policies that
maximize the gradient of the Qft value functions at any time
t. Given that the the function Qft depends on the optimal
policy, this process is repeated over iterations arriving at the
required prescription function γ˜ft . This is repeated at all the
belief states piht ∈ Π so that we get the final equilibrium
function θt [pit].
Algorithm 1: Optimal policy
Input: Qft , Qlt ∀γft ∈ Kγ
f
t , pit ∈ Π
θt [pit] ∀pit ∈ Π
Output: θ˜
1 Initialize: V fT+1, V
l
T+1
2 for t = T . . . 1 do
3 Evaluate: Qft = FollowerQ
(
V ft+1
)
4 Evaluate: Qlt = LeaderQ
(
V lt+1
)
5 for pit ∈ Π do
6 for γlt ∈ Π do
7 Compute: Λ
(
γlt
)
= PolicyF
(
Qft , γ
l
t
)
8 end
9 Compute: γ˜lt = PolicyL
(
Qlt
)
10 γ˜ft = Λ
(
γ˜lt
)
11 for xt ∈ X do
12 V ft (pit, xt) = Eγ˜
f
t ,γ˜
l
t
[
Qft (pit, xt, At)
]
13 end
14 V lt = Eγ˜
f
t ,γ˜
l
t
[
Qlt (pit, At)
]
15 θ˜ [pit] = γ˜
f
t , γ˜
l
t
16 end
17 end
Result: θ˜
2) Leader Strategy: The leader, with the knowledge of
the strategy set of the follower Λft
(
γlt
)
, computed as a
best response to its strategies, optimizes its own strategy by
solving the maximization equation in (22) given as
γ˜lt = arg max
γlt
E
[
Qft
(
pit, At, γ
f
t
)]
. (32)
It is a known fact that this results in pure strategies. This
implies that the solution could be easily computed as the
greedy policy γ˜lt that has the highest Q value for each belief
pit.
Finally, the equilibrium strategy is given by γ˜t = θt[pit],
where (γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t ) and γ˜
f
t = BR
f
t
(
γlt)
)
.
V. CONVERGENCE
In this section, we prove the convergence of the proposed
RL algorithm to the equilibrium strategy of the statistical
Stackelberg equilibrium. We put forth the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The policies σ˜ =
(
σ˜f , σ˜l
)
thus generated
from the RL algorithm using the particle filter does form
a -MPSE of the Stackelberg game i.e. For the follower, we
show,
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l
t + t ≥ Jf,σ
f ,σ˜l
t (33)
and for the leader we show,
J l,σ˜
f ,σ˜l
t + t ≥ J
f,Λ(σl),σl
t . (34)
Proof: The proof to (33) has been shown in Theorem 2
while the proof to (34) has been shown in Theorem 3.
Algorithm 2: Policy Evaluation (Q-value Estimation)
Input: V ft+1, V lt+1, γlt
Output: Qft , Qlt
1 for pit, γft ∈ Π×Kγ
f
do
2 Initialize: Qft , Q
l
t
3 for l = 1 . . . L do
4 for aft , alt ∈ Af ×Al do
5 at =
(
aft , a
l
t
)
6 for xt ∈ X do
7 Sample: xt+1 ∼ τ (·|xt, at)
8 pift+1 = PF
(
pit, γ
f
t , at
)
9 T f = Rft (xt, at) + δV
f
t+1
(
pift+1, xt+1
)
Rlxt, at = R
l
t (xt, at)
10 Qft
(
pit, xt, at, γ
f
t
)
=
(1− α)Qft
(
pit, xt, at, γ
f
t
)
+ αT f
11 end
12 pilt+1 = PF
(
pit, γ
f
t , at
)
13 T l = Epit
[
Rl (Xt, at)
]
+ V lt+1 (pit+1)
14 Qlt
(
pit, at, γ
f
t
)
=
(1− α)Qlt
(
pit, at, γ
f
t
)
+ αT l
15 end
16 end
17 end
Result: Qft , Qlt
Lemma 2: The worst case error in the value function if we
use a particle filter to update the belief state can be expressed
as
‖V it
(
pit, x
i
t
)− V ?it (pit, xit) ‖ ≤ 1 (35)
where pit = µt[1 : a1−1] and pit = µ̂t[1 : a1−1] are the belief
trajectories with and without the particle filters.
Proof: This could be proved by using the Chernoff-
Hoeffding bounds for deviation between sum of independent
random variables from their true expectation. We leave the
complete proof for the online version [20].
It is also worth noting that the the value epsilon is a
function of the length of the time horizon and the discount
factor. Moreover, it goes down with the increase in the
number of particles used by the particle filter to estimate
the belief. In our paper, we invariably choose a large K.
A. Convergence of the Follower
We put forth two lemmas that is used to prove the
theorems. The lemmas have not been proven in this section
due to lack of space but could be referred from the online
version.
Lemma 3: ∀t ∈ [T ], ∀µ̂t and xt ∈ X ,
V ft (pit, xt) = J
f,σ˜f ,σ˜f ,pi
t (36)
where σ˜t =
(
σ˜ft , σ˜
l
t
)
is the optimal policy at time t, pit =
µ̂t[1 : a1−1] and Jt is the accumulated optimal returns from
t till T .
Lemma 4: ∀t ∈ T ,∀ (a1:t−1, x1:t) ∈ Hft , σft ,
V ?t
f (pit, xt) ≥ Eσ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,pit
[
Q?ft
(
pit, Xt, At, γ˜
f
t
)]
(37)
where pit = µt[1 : a1−1] and V ? and Q? represent the value
functions in the case where model is known.
Theorem 2: A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above
algorithm is an -MPSE of the game. i.e
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t + 2 ≥ Jf,σ
f ,σ˜l,pit
t (38)
We prove it through the technique of mathematical in-
duction and will use the results that were proved before in
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Proof: For the base case, we consider t = T . The
expected sum of returns, when the player i follows the
equilibrium policy σ˜ is given as
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pi
T = V
?f
T (piT , xT ) , (39)
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pi
T = V
f
T (piT , xT ) , (40)
which is true from Lemma 3. From Lemma 2,
V ?fT (piT , xT ) ≤ V fT (piT , xT ) +  (41)
for some chosen small T . From Lemma 6 and (41) we get
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,piT
T + T ≥ Jf,σ
f ,σ˜l,piT
T (42)
Assuming that the condition in (38) holds at t = t + 1, we
get,
J
f,σ˜f ,σ˜l,pit+1
t+1 + t+1 ≥ Jf,σ
f ,σ˜l,pit
t+1 (43)
We need to prove that the expression in (38) holds for t = t
as well.
Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t (44)
= V ft (pit, xt) (45)
≥ V ?ft (pit, xt)− t+1 (46)
≥ Eσft ,σ˜lt,pit
[
Q?t
f
(
pit, xt, At, γ˜
f
t
)]
− t+1 (47)
= Eσ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,pit
[
Rf (xt, at) + δV
?f
t+1 (pit+1, xt+1)
]
− t+1
(48)
≥ Eσft ,σ˜lt,pit
[
Rf (xt, at) + δV
f
t+1 (pit+1, xt+1)
]
− t+1
(49)
= Eσ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,pit
[
Rf (xt, at) + δJ
f,σ˜f ,σ˜l,pit+1
t+1
]
− t+1 (50)
≥ Eσft ,σ˜lt,pit [Rf (xt, at) + δJf,σ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,pit+1
t+1 − (1 + δ) t+1]
(51)
= J
f,σft ,σ˜
l
t,pit
t − (1 + δ) t+1 (52)
Thus, Jf,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t + t ≥ Jf,σ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,pit
t .
(45) is from Lemma 5 and (46) is from Lemma 2. (47)
and (48) are from standard definitions while (49) is true
because V ?lt+1 is optimal. (50) is from Lemma 5 followed
by using assumption made at t = t+ 1 in (51).
B. Convergence of the Leader
We put forth two lemmas that is used to prove the
theorems. The lemmas have not been proven in this section
due to lack of space but could be referred from the online
version.
Lemma 5: ∀t ∈ [T ], ∀µ̂t,
V lt (pit) = J
l,Λ(σ˜l),σ˜l,pi
t (53)
where σ˜t is the optimal policy at time t, pit = µ̂t[1 : a1−1]
and Jt is the accumulated optimal returns from t till T .
Lemma 6: ∀t ∈ T ,∀ (a1:t−1) ∈ Hft ,σlt,
V ?t
l (pit) ≥ EΛ(σ
l
t),σ
l
t,pit
[
Q?lt
(
pit, At, γ˜
f
t
)]
(54)
where pit = µt[1 : a1−1] and V ? and Q? represent the value
functions in the case where model is known.
Theorem 3: A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above
algorithm is an -MPSE of the game. i.e
J l,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t + t ≥ J
l,Λ(σl),σl,pit
t (55)
We prove it through the technique of mathematical in-
duction and will use the results that were proved before in
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Proof: For the base case, we consider t = T . The
expected sum of returns, when the player i follows the
equilibrium policy σ˜ is given as
J
l,Λ(σ˜l),σ˜l,pi
T = V
?l
T (piT ) , (56)
J
l,Λ(σ˜l),σ˜l,pi
T = V
l
T (piT ) , (57)
which is true from Lemma 5. From Lemma 2,
V ?lT (piT ) ≤ V lT (piT ) + T (58)
for some chosen small T .
From Lemma 6 and (58) we get
J l,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,piT
T + T ≥ J
l,Λ(σf),σ˜l,piT
T (59)
Assuming that the condition in (55) holds at t = t + 1, we
get,
J
l,σ˜f ,σ˜l,pit+1
t+1 + t+1 ≥ J
l,Λ(σf),σ˜l,pit
t+1 (60)
We need to prove that the expression in (55) holds for t = t
as well.
J l,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t (61)
= V lt (pit) (62)
≥ V ?lt (pit)− t+1 (63)
≥ EΛ(σlt),σlt,pit
[
Q?t
l
(
pit, xt, At, γ˜
f
t
)]
− t+1 (64)
= EΛ(σ
l
t),σ
l
t,pit
[
Rl(xt, at) + δV
?l
t+1 (pit)
]
− t+1 (65)
≥ EΛ(σlt),σlt,pit [Rl(xt, at) + δV lt+1 (pit)]− t+1 (66)
= EΛ(σ
l
t),σ
l
t,pit
[
Rl(xt, at) + δJ
l,σ˜f ,σ˜l,pit+1
t+1
]
− t+1 (67)
≥ EΛ(σlt),σlt,pit [Rl(xt, at) + δJ l,Λ(σ
l),σl,pit+1
t+1
− (1 + δ) t+1] (68)
= J
l,Λ(σl),σl,pit
t − (1 + δ) t+1 (69)
Thus, J l,σ˜
f ,σ˜l,pit
t + t ≥ J
l,Λ(σl),σl,pit
t .
(62) is from Lemma 5 and (63) is from Lemma 2. (64)
and (65) are from standard definitions while (66) is true
because V ?lt+1 is optimal. (67) is from Lemma 5 followed
by using assumption made at t = t+ 1 in (68).
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider an example of a repeated
Stackelberg security game [1] to demonstrate the results of
our RL algorithm. We assume a state space X ∈ {0, 1}
and action spaces Al ∈ {0, 1},Af ∈ {0, 1} for leader
and the follower respectively. The state transition matrix
i.e. τ (xt+1|xt, at) = .1 if xt = xt+1 and 0.9 otherwise.
We assume the discounting factor δ = 0.6. The rewards
corresponding to the actions of one player is dependent both
the state and the actions of the other player. This is tabulated
in I and II for state 0 and state 1 respectively.
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the MPSE policies γ˜ft of the
follower at different values of the estimated belief state pit
for states xt = 0 and xt = 1 respectively. The plotted graphs
are the probabilities with which we choose action ait = 1.
Fig. 3 show the MPSE policies of the leader pertaining to
the probabilities of taking action alt = 1 given a belief state
pit. The plots of our algorithm are compared across the true
strategy that was obtained by assuming the knowledge of the
dynamics of MDP and then solving the fixed point equation.
The strategies estimated using the proposed RL algorithm
coincides with the true optimal establishing the accuracy of
our algorithm.
TABLE I
REWARD MATRIX FOR xt = 0
Attacker Attacker
A1 A2
Defender D1 (2, 1) (4, 0)
Defender D2 (1, 0) (3, 2)
TABLE II
REWARD MATRIX FOR xt = 1
Attacker Attacker
A1 A2
Defender D1 (2, 1) (4, 0)
Defender D2 (1, 0) (3, 2)
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed a stochastic Stackelberg game
where there is a leader and a follower. Follower has a
private type which evolves in a controlled Markovian fashion,
whose statistics are not known to both the players. We
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Fig. 1. γ˜lt(1|0): Follower’s action given xt = 0 for all belief state under
MPSE
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Fig. 2. γ˜ft (1|1x): Follower’s action given xt = 1 for all belief state under
MPSE
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Fig. 3. γ˜lt(1|0): Leader’s action corresponding to its MPSE policy
proposed a RL algorithm, based on Expected Sarsa along
with particle filters to learn the dynamics of the model by
sampling and estimate the Qft and Q
l
t functions that captures
the rewards achieved following different policies from a
particular state for both the players. Then, using the MPSE
algorithm presented in [1] to converge upon the perfect
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game for both the players
within a  margin.
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